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Bio-Ethics from Image of God and Soul

Doug Kennard, Ph. D., Biblical Studies Department, Bryan College, Dayton, TN 37321
Abstract
Faced with the near unanimity of biblical anthropology among biblical theology (Botterweck
& Ringgren, 1974–2006; Brown, 1975; Harris, Archer, & Waltke, 1980; Kittle & Friedrich, 1964–1976;
VanGemeren, 1997), I propose an analysis of the biblical words and concepts, focusing on: (1) “image
of God” and (2) “soul.” This approach results in a functionalism, which I call a multi-faceted unity. I
propose to extend these biblical theology categories into the ﬁeld of bio-ethics for implications. This
approach is in contrast to some Christian bio-ethicists who start from the ﬁeld of philosophy or biology
and tack some devotional elements of the Bible on the rafters of their view.
(1) Image of God means “a representation of God” showing that God rules here (Wolff, 1974,
pp. 160-161; Tell Fekheriye inscription 1, 12, 15–16; 4Q504 fragment 8, lines 4–6). God sets the purpose of
His image to ﬁnitely rule under God’s sovereignty. As images of God we humans are to play god in bioethics, doing miniature acts of sovereignty under the Sovereign God (Genesis 1:26–28; 5:1, 3; 9:6; James
3:9).
This legitimates humans attempting prevention and recovery means like: ways of controlling pests (for
example, serpents), aids to diminish pain in child birth, pesticides and herbicides, fertilization of crops,
genetically modiﬁed food, inoculations, drug and surgery treatment, AID, in vitro-fertilization, stem cell
treatment, gene therapy, and cloning. Such an image of God concept identiﬁes the theoretically
permissible even though I recognize methodologically ethical principles raised elsewhere in the paper
bring certain restrictions.
In ruling the creation, anything is permitted provided it: (a) Is not excluded by God’s command
(Genesis 3:17–19; Romans 14:10–12). (b) Fits within God’s design parameters, and is (c) actively engaged
in for the Lord’s glory (Romans 14:6–12). (d) Helps and does not hinder (Romans 14:13–15:6). (e) Fits within
an afﬁrming conscience, rather than violating one’s conscience (a New Covenant thing; Romans 14:5,
22–23).
(2) The biblical concept of soul entails a wholistic meaning of “complete living and willing being” in
a non-microbial pre-modern manner (for example, Genesis 1:20, 24, 30; 2:7; 9:4–5, 10). Thus, soul means
that animals have certain privileges against extremes of bio-ethical abuse.
Biblically bio-ethically humans have a right to life. Those who kill a fetus are then culpable of murder
and were to be killed by capital punishment (Genesis 4:1, 25; Exodus 21:22–24; Psalms 51:5; 139:13–15;
Revelation 6:9).
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Introduction
Bio-ethics as a ﬁeld is dominated by philosophers
and biologists using philosophical assumptions and
categories. Since God created humans and provided
a revelational description of us, this biblicism should
reframe our conceptuality of humanity so as to fund
bio-ethics from biblical thought forms, from start to
ﬁnish. I propose to present an analysis of the words
and concepts articulated in Old and New Testament
literature that address the nature of a human. The
conclusions presented from this analysis will be used
to make a presentation of an integrated model of a
human. I propose to then extend these biblical theology
categories into the ﬁeld of bio-ethics to unpack their
bio-ethical implications.
Following this approach results in a functionalism

(because of the redundant descriptions of wholistic
humanity in the model), which I call a multi-faceted
unity (of: image of God, soul, spirit, body, heart, mind,
will, and conscience). However, the concreteness of
especially Hebrew descriptive words could also be
appealed to in claiming this model as an ontological
model because it is describing the way we are from
the biblical perspective, and so we should think about
ourselves in this manner (Kennard, 1992). This
means that this view should be thought as ontological
and functionalist both, even though this is a novel
way for philosophy to conceive of humanity. However,
part of the point of this paper is to call philosophy and
other human disciplines back to being reconﬁgured
by the Word of God and biblical theology.
For example, within Christendom there are many
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views of the nature of the human being. Among the most
prominent are two views rooted in Platonism which
have had long-standing traditions in Christianity.
Dichotomists, following the Epistle to Diognetus
(1964), make a distinction between the material and
immaterial parts of a human, reﬂective of Plato’s soul
and body concepts. Theologians adhering to this view
argue that soul and spirit are used interchangeably,
whereas trichotomists, following Justin Martyr, point
out that soul and spirit are distinct (Justin Martyr,
1949, Apol. 1.29). Such a trichotomy view is reﬂective
of the neo-platonic trichotomy view of: spirit, soul,
and body. In the twentieth century, additional views
of humanity emerged including advocates of a holistic
model. For example, one holistic model in the wake
of Gestalt psychology maintains that the person is
greater than the sum of his parts.
In contrast to this, biologists deﬁne humans either
by comparison to animal properties and traits, or
if they are Christians through a devotional lens of
Jesus’ disciples. For example, Institute for Creation
Research biologist Daniel Criswell deﬁned humans
and proposed an ethic that identiﬁed that the core
trait of humanity was to be a servant in the pattern
of: (1) a non-alpha male from a herd or pack and (2)
Jesus’ disciple (Criswell, 2006, pp. 1–4). With the
proliferation of widely divergent views there is a
real danger of the disciplines of ethics and theology
fragmenting into different Wittgensteinian language
games unable to meaningfully communicate between
them. Is such a postmodern option a way to leave this
discipline? How should a wise Christian choose among
all these views of humanness? To be sure, whatever
model one chooses, it brings with it a worldview
which is indebted to the philosophy upon which it is
built. The author rejects bio-ethics built within these
alternative world views as signiﬁcantly ﬂawed, for
they will insulate the advocate from arriving at a
consistent biblicism.
My approach is in contrast to the perspectives
provided by philosophy, psychology, sociology,
anthropology, and biology. Those disciplines give
answers consistent with their worldviews and the
methodologies dominant in these approaches. If an
evangelical is working in these disciplines, often
the extent of Christian integration is hanging a few
biblical proof texts on the rafters. When Christians
extend their bilingual beliefs from these disciplines
into the ﬁeld of bio-ethics then they become a parody
of Star Trek: timidly going where everyone has gone
before.
The author suggests instead using the approach
of the biblical theology movement, that a Christian
functional model of humanity start ﬁrst with the
biblical text and then work out the implications for
bio-ethics. In the second half of the twentieth century
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within the descriptive biblical theology movement
a model of the human being as a multifaceted
unity gained dominance in the discipline. The near
unanimity of biblical theologians embracing this
model can be seen by the treatment in the theological
wordbooks (Botterweck & Ringgren, 1974–2006;
Brown, 1975; Harris, Archer, & Waltke, 1980; Kittle
& Friedrich, 1964–76; VanGemeren, 1997) and by the
scholarly descriptions of humanity from specialized
biblical theologies (Dunn, 1998, pp. 51–78; Wolff,
1974), which corroborate the word studies of this
paper. This near unanimity was bemoaned in the
open question time and in the paper by Jeffrey Boyd
at the Wheaton Theology Conference in 1997 focusing
on the integration of psychology and theology. At this
conference, Kennard and Holmes championed this
near unanimous view as a framework for integrating
psychology and theology (Kennard & Holmes,
1997). Boyd’s concern was the loss of spirituality as
behaviorists reduce humans to programmed matter in
appeals to a wholistic view of soul. These descriptive
biblical theologians are not arguing for what some
behaviorists claim, for the behaviorists selectively
appeal to a small part of biblical theology research to
support their behaviorist agenda. So, Boyd’s concern
should be alleviated by the profound degree of
spirituality retained within the view presented here.
Faced with a variety of psychological, philosophical
and theological models, and the near unanimity
of biblical anthropology among descriptive biblical
theology, how is the Christian to understand the
nature of humanness? I propose to follow the biblical
theologians through an analysis of the words and
concepts articulated in Old Testament and New
Testament literature that address the nature of a
human. The conclusions presented from this analysis
will be used to make a presentation of an integrated
model of a human. I propose to then extend these
biblical theology categories into the ﬁeld of bio-ethics
to unpack their bio-ethical implications.
This method provides biblical grounding and
thought forms to warrant the design and revealed
framework for bio-ethics. From this approach we can
with real warrant, boldly go where few have gone
before, because God leads the narrow route through
the galaxy of bio-ethical issues. The focus of this
paper will be on the ethical issues that emerge from a
biblical anthropology of image of God and soul.
Image of God
A range of traditional options identify how several
theologies understand humans to be made in the
image of God. For example, Irenaeus proposed “image
of God” to describe reason and free will, while “likeness
of God” he identiﬁed as the supernatural endowment
through the Spirit (Irenaeus, 1995, 3.23.5 and 5.6.1).
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Aquinas follows Irenaeus view identifying the imago
dei as retained at the Fall but the likeness is lost at
the Fall (Aquinas, 1952, 1.93.4). In contrast, Martin
Luther and John Calvin identiﬁed “image of God” as
identical to “likeness of God” in that both afﬁrm the
ability to reason and original righteousness (Calvin,
n.d., 1:1; Luther, 1958, 1: 60–62). Both Reformers saw
these qualities as signiﬁcantly marred through the
Fall. Others followed their lead, such as Emil Brunner
who took “image of God” as a symbol for “moral
uprightness or righteousness of God” (Brunner, 1947,
p. 388). In contrast, Karl Barth identiﬁed “image of
God” is essentially the relationality of humans that
permits relationship with God and fellow humans
after the pattern of the divine relationships within
the Trinity (Barth, 1936–1969, 3/2:196). Additionally,
Thomas Torrance and G. C. Berkouwer identify “image
of God” as “the focal point in the interrelationships
between God and the universe” (Berkouwer, 1962,
pp. 87–89, 179, 197–198; Torrance, 1981, p. 129).
None of these traditional views are how the Bible or
the descriptive biblical theology movement uses the
term of “image of God.”
The concept of humankind as the “image of God”
is ﬁrst introduced in the creation account in Genesis.
As God creates man, He formulates an image of
Himself (Genesis 1:26–28). The words for “image”
  , ∋ίκóνα) and “likeness” (dmtnw/
(s lmnw/
 
 ,
óμοίωσιν
     )
) state that characteristics attributed to God
in this passage are reﬂected in a human. There is no
distinction between the two words; they are totally
interchangeable (Harris, Archer, & Waltke, 1980,
1:192). In this Genesis 1 instance, Eugene Merrill
clariﬁes that the   (“in”) is best understood as the
“beth of identity” and parallel to the   (“according to”)
in indicating functionality (Alexander & Baker, 2003,
pp. 443–444). That is, “image and likeness of
God” mean that humans function in the role as
representation and representative of God.
This account introduces humans as a
representation of God on earth. In the ancient
Near East, kings would erect images of themselves
indicating regions that were appropriately within
their domain. For example, Ramesses II had his
image hewn out of rock at the mouth of the nahr elkelb on the Mediterranean north of Beirut, indicating
he ruled this area (Tell Fekheriye inscription 1, 12,
15–16 in Millard & Bordreuil, 1982, p. 137; 4Q504
fragment 8, lines 4–6 in Wise, Abegg, & Cook,
2005, p. 526; VanGemeren, 1997, 1:969–970; Wolff,
1974, pp. 160–161). Therefore, as God’s image, man
indicates by his very presence that God rules the
earth. This emphasis of the greatness of God’s creative
and sovereign power reﬂects the emphasis of the ﬁrst
literary unit (Genesis 1:1–2:3) as it polemics other
ancient Near East cosmologies.

45
Image of God indicates humans are God’s
representative on earth; man pictures God as both
sovereign ruler and creator (Alexander & Baker,
2003, pp. 442, 444–445; Apocrypha: Sir. 17.3–4;
Wis. 2.23; Brown, 1975, 2:287; Kittel & Friedrich,
1964–76, 2:392; Freedman & Simon, 1977: Gen. Rab.
8.10; Harris, Archer, & Waltke, 1980, 2:768; Neusner,
1988: b.Sanh. 38b; m ’Abot 3.14; b. Meg. 9a; 28a;
VanGemeren, 1997, 1:969; von Rad, 1962, 1:146; Wolff,
1974, pp. 159–165;). Thus, images of God are designed
by God to rule the creation (Genesis 1:26). To help
facilitate this ruling, the images of God are blessed to
both reproduce themselves and thereby facilitate this
ruling of the created order (Genesis 1:28). “Filling the
earth” connects these two themes, showing the extent
of man’s procreative power and making it possible for
him to rule. Creation and rule require a male and a
female in the human realm. Persons are individually
God’s image and as a married pair the couple is God’s
image. Not that relationality is meant by image but
that individually we humans contribute toward
ruling and that married pairs also contribute toward
ruling (being fruitful, multiplying to ﬁll the earth so
subduing and ruling can occur). God’s image as one,
yet plural, hints at the majestic creator character of
Elohim (Kennard, 2002, pp. 87–89). From the chaotic
images of formlessness that begin the passage, God
shows his goodness through purposefully designing
creation and then humans in His image. Humans are
to bring this creation under our control, which would
include remaking it purposefully for the ends we
think are best under our stewardship to God.
Genesis goes on to develop the idea that God’s image
included being His son, ﬁtted by a loving Father with
an appropriate situation, work, life and marriage
(Genesis 2:23–24; 5:1–3; Luke 3:38; Alexander &
Baker, 2003, pp. 442; Instruction of Merikare 1.106
in Prichard, 1969, pp. 414–418). The few additional
references to humans as God’s image indicate that
this image continues beyond the fall (Genesis 5:1, 3;
9:6; James 3:9) though dragged through futility and
death as a result of sin.
In contrast to a creation-based view of human
as image of God, the image of Christ is a future
representation of Christian humans in their
gloriﬁcation. Jesus Christ in His incarnation comes
in the image of God, but upon completing His
work, He was highly exalted (2 Corinthians 4:4;
Colossians 10:15; Philippians 2:6–11). As a result, the
Christian is not merely having his damaged image
of God repaired but is also being made into a more
exalted image of the gloriﬁed Son of God (Romans
8:29–30; 1 Corinthians 15:49; 2 Corinthians 3:18;
4:4; Philippians 3:21). In fact, the Christian’s fallen
condition will be transformed into a higher state than
that of Adam before the fall.
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The concept of “image of God” has implications
for the individual as he lives out life. Terms such
as sovereignty are associated with the concept
and indicate the responsibility the ﬁrst human
inhabitants were given for the world in which
they lived. The terms for “subdue” and “rule”
   are very forceful, encouraging utilization
and dominance of the creation by humans (Genesis
1:26, 28). Such forceful words, are used elsewhere
in instances of conquest and rape, implying that the
created world will resist some of our rule (Leviticus
26:17; Numbers 32:22, 29; Nehemiah 5:5; Jeremiah
34:11, 16; Genesis 3:1–5 shows ﬁrst resistance). This
is especially the case once the creation is subjected
to futility by the oracle of judgment in response to
the fall of humans (Genesis 3:14–19; Romans 8:20).
However, humans are to provide the structures and
guidelines for co-existing and engaging with their
natural environment. In this sense, our responsibility
to nature included those encompassed by that of a
ﬁduciary or curator (Genesis 2:15–19). The original
inhabitants provided organization to diminish chaos
and promote an environment in which the needs of
all are observed. Humans are to nurture nature.
Both before the Fall and after the Fall, the original
inhabitants provided organization to diminish chaos
and promote an environment in which the needs
of all are observed. This is evident in the naming,
organizing and agricultural work humans were to
accomplish. This structure provided an atmosphere
in which the inherent potential of both human beings
and nature itself could be actualized. As images and
sons of God, humans are to play god in bio-ethics,
not be God (the Sovereign), but do miniature acts of
sovereignty within the stewardship which has been
delegated to us by the Sovereign God. In the same
way as our kids play house and army men, so in our
stewardship we are to play god in bringing control to
the area of biology.
Anything that is not biblically excluded, we have
free range to conceptually plan and explore for the
potential gain that we can bring to the creation.
Such subduing control does not control all factors
for God remains sovereign over our stewardship
under Him. The causalities are best understood as
a divine-human compatibilism in which both God
and humans choose and implement everything that
comes to pass (Genesis 4:1; Acts 2:23; Kennard, 2002,
pp. 135–166, 185–204). Thus we do not violate God’s
sovereignty by our humanly responsible attempts
to subdue and rule the creation. This legitimates
humans attempting prevention and recovery means
like: ways of controlling pests (for example, serpents),
aids to diminish pain in child-birth, pesticides and
herbicides, fertilization of crops, genetically modiﬁed
food, inoculations, drug and surgery treatment,
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AID, in vitro-fertilization (especially if all fertilized
eggs are used to try to implant), stem cell treatment,
gene therapy, and reproductive cloning (Cole-Turner,
1997, pp. 149–151). Such an image of God concept
identiﬁes the theoretically permissible even though I
recognize methodologically ethical principles raised
elsewhere in the paper bring certain restrictions.
For example, I recognize that embryonic stem cell
research should not destroy the embryo (because it
is life) but may be possible without such destruction,
however pragmatically may not be therapeutically
productive unless the problem of tumor production is
signiﬁcantly diminished. Furthermore, a clone does
not become a substitute for a person, nor should be
insurance for a person (contrary to the movie, The
Island), but such a clone is a whole new image of God.
That is, cloning only provides a biological duplicate to
progress through a developmental process that will
at least in some respect be different from the original.
Nature provides possibilities, whereas nurture
realizes some of those possibilities.
Thus genetic determinism is too limited an idea
to reﬂect what biblical divine-human compatibilism
entails. In fact, with only 20,000–25,000 proteincoding genes this is probably too few to determine all
aspects of our life and destiny (International Human
Genome Sequencing Consortium, 2004, pp. 931–945).
Furthermore, if one could methodologically develop
ﬁltering to recognize cystic ﬁbrosis or Down syndrome,
genetic therapy of the zygote would not be forcing
genes upon the new individual (albeit, with parental
consent) for these genes would be utilized in the early
creation process making the new individual who he
is in creation. Nurture, of course, would then develop
the given of these genetic possibilities. Likewise, a
clone and a genetically manipulated fertilized egg
is a new image of God in a different situation than
that of the original. This is evident in recognizing
observable differences among identical twins who
occupy the same womb. The nurturing environment
will signiﬁcantly affect the development of this new
image of God. The cloned or genetically aided image
of God will live life within the same stewardship
as other images of God: responsible, accountable,
answerable, praised or judged.
Of course, the fact that we can and should explore
ways of controlling the creation does not guarantee
funding or ease in obtaining resources. The utility of
greater gain for the greater good would argue for the
public funding to pursue those health needs which
would accomplish the most societal good. Communal
oversight helps to: (1) alleviate potential problems,
(2) limit violating societal conscience, and (3) rule
creation responsibly. For example, in the United
States genetically modiﬁed food is not much of an
issue probably because of the oversight brought about
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by the Food and Drug Administration (“Talk of the
Nation: Science Friday,” 2005). This was aided by the
FDA deﬁning genetically modiﬁed food as “essentially
equivalent” to the natural. Perhaps something like
the FDA could help relieve the international fears as
well. Furthermore, personal funding could be utilized
to support those concerns which an individual is
passionate about. Provided resources and means
were available, such expressions of control are to
be encouraged. As images of God, we each have
responsibility to reason and obtain consent of the
responsible parties in pursuing our control of part
of the creation. Of course, the obtaining of resources
does not provide license to violate ethics (for example,
abortion to obtain stem cells will be shown to be a
violation of biblical ethics).
To facilitate this control of the creation, human
beings possess cognitive abilities that enable selfreﬂective thought and the ability to assess, learn from
past experience, anticipate future contingencies, and
to choose purposefully to accomplish desired ends
(Kennard, 1999, pp. 35–70). These capacities make
him uniquely qualiﬁed for the task of stewardship.
For example, Adam was given the responsibility of
naming the creatures in the garden and identifying
a partner for himself (Genesis 2:20). The roles and
responsibilities inherent within humanness, such as
cultivation and care, suggest that the truly human
individual comprehends the ecological balance of
nature and interacts with it in a manner that respects
the place of all things created. This individual
understands that the project of true humanness
is increased when the potential of all nature is
encouraged. Thus to thwart the actualization of the
least of created things hinders the peace (shalom)
intended for all.
In ruling the creation, anything is permitted
provided it is: (1) Not excluded by God’s command,
like judging someone with a different opinion or
practice (Romans 14:3–10, 13). That is, don’t disobey
God or He could judge you (Genesis 3:17–19; Romans
14:10–12). (2) Anything is permitted provided it ﬁts
within the priority of the design parameters and is
(3) actively engaged in for the Lord’s glory (Romans
14:6–12). (4) Anything wise is permitted, in that it
helps and does not hinder (Romans 14:13–15:6). (5)
Anything is permitted that ﬁts within an afﬁrming
conscience, rather than violating one’s conscience (a
New Covenant thing; Romans 14:5, 22–23).
To facilitate the image of God’s rule of the creation
God provides blessings of: fruitfulness, to ﬁll the earth,
to subdue the earth, and to rule the earth (Genesis
1:26–30, the construction in Genesis 1:28 “God
blessed them and said . . .” identiﬁes the content of the
blessing using a narrative connecter waw consecutive
as the author repeatedly uses throughout chapter
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1 and elsewhere in Genesis; 8:20–9:17). Ruling the
earth is both the design goal for we humans and a
blessing from God (Genesis 1:26, 28). These elements
of blessing are softer than commands because they
are within the genre of blessing, which the Blesser,
God grounds (Genesis 2:3; 5:2; 9:1; 12:2–3). Blessing
entails a relationship of privilege, mostly guaranteed
by the blesser in relationship, which in this case is God.
In this creation context God’s statement accomplishes
what it says, so these blessings are guaranteed.
God’s speech in the ﬁrst literary unit (Genesis
1–2:4) accomplishes His statement to make it so,
even though He uses imperatives in these statements
to render in reality: light, separation, waters, lights
and swarms (Genesis 1:3, 6, 9, 14, 20). Few would
conjecture that the imperative in each of these divine
statements renders light or water culpable for their
existence, so God incorporates divine statements using
imperatives in this creation account as statements of
His guaranteeing the creation order. However, that
does not guarantee that these spoken creations (light,
vegetation, and animals) are everywhere, nor does it
guarantee all humans will be procreatively fruitful.
Blessing makes it generically realizable for the human
race, but not necessarily speciﬁcally realizable for
everyone (Genesis 1:22, 28); some may be infertile
without being culpable for sin concerning this. God
makes us fruitful, and so corporately we ﬁll the earth.
God enables us to subdue, so we can rule.
Though these are God grounded corporate blessings
there is corporate culpability for involvement indicated
through the use of imperatives to moral beings. The
use of plural Hebrew Qal imperatives for all ﬁve
blessings “Be fruitful, multiply, ﬁll, subdue, and
rule,” and the LXX (Septuagint) having “be fruitful
and multiply” as present imperatives shows the group
of humans should as a group participate within the
corporate blessing which God provides. However, the
LXX use of “ﬁll, subdue and rule” as aorist indicatives
softens involvement with these statements of God’s
guaranteeing the design plan in this text. Perhaps,
the second century BC LXX perspective of the harm
accomplished against others through the multiple
captivities and dispersions diminishes its obligation
when compared to the Mosaic context of the MT.
No one is personally culpable if he does not avail
himself to all blessings. For example, Jesus had the
blessing of having angel protection (Matthew 4:6),
but that is no cause for foolish choices. Jesus was
not culpable for not availing himself with all these
potential blessings.
God’s blessings can change. For example, the
blessing of a vegetarian diet changed to include meat
at the Noahic Covenant (Genesis 1:29–30; 9:2–4).
While God’s corporate blessings in themselves
are not themselves ethically binding for individuals.
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However, they can have restrictions within them, so
there may be aspects of responsibility. When there is
individual culpability, it is usually spelled out with its
gain or consequences. For example, gain is apparent
in that the male and female within image of God
fosters fruitfulness (Genesis 1:27–28). This would
have obvious ethical implications for heterosexual
marriage. Likewise, the Noahic Covenant stipulation
against murder is immersed within an inclusio
of blessing, and provided with the teeth of capital
punishment to enforce its mandate (Genesis 9:1–7).
As a blessing, fruitfulness to ﬁll is only reiterated
when the population is small, showing God’s insistence
on individuals participation in procreation is only
essential when the population is small (Genesis 1:28;
9:1, 7).
So blessing is contextually dependent. Within the
speciﬁc context of family protection and gain from
labor, children are a blessing from the Lord (Psalms
127:1–5). This psalm does not declare kids to be a
blessing in all contexts. For example, a destructive
foolish son is not a blessing (Proverbs 10:1; 30:11–14).
So the context of one’s child’s life virtues and vices
indicates whether a speciﬁc child is a blessing for his
parents or not.
This creation pattern does not legitimate natural
rights or natural law, but rather God provides the
privilege of blessings in responsible relationship. We as
images of God can not insist on a right of the status of
what we are. That is, an infertile lady can’t insist that
God make her fruitful. The whole ethical approach
that defends natural rights or natural law is far more
indebted to Stoicism, Aristotle, Aquinas and Jefferson
than to the biblical text. Now don’t misunderstand
me, there may be truth through natural rights and
it may be helpful in bilingual communication to other
worldviews to use natural rights arguments, but
natural rights and law are not the biblical theology
framework within which God creates, elects, and
provides. That is, we images of God must frame our
ethic by God’s ﬁat and thus ﬁt into His biblically
revealed framework for our stewardship. These
creation frameworks especially develop blessings of:
fruitfulness, to ﬁll the earth, to subdue the earth,
and to rule the earth (Genesis 1:26–30; 8:20–9:17).
Amid these blessings is the stewardship with ethical
admonitions of: (1) cultivating and keeping the garden
and then the earth (which has ramiﬁcations for
development, recycling, and retention of resources),
(2) enjoying the freedom and abundant resources,
and (3) don’t disobey God or He can judge (Genesis 2:
15–17; 3:17–19; 8:20–9:17). These ethical frameworks
have huge ethical ramiﬁcations.
Let us brieﬂy explore fruitfulness to ﬁll the earth.
This blessing is afﬁrmed whenever the population is
low, so it is a critical admonition in those instances
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(Genesis 1:28; 9:1, 7). Obviously, on an individual
level fertility can be foregone as a human wishes to
pursue a noble goal, like a single life of ministry to
Christ (for example, 1 Corinthians 7). Presumably,
this would also legitimate family planning so that
ministry and the quality of child rearing could also
be facilitated. This is because sexuality is not just for
procreation but also includes pleasure and cultivating
a marriage relationship within its purposes (Genesis
2:23–24; 26:8; Proverbs 30:18–19; SS. 5:1). The
spilling of Onan’s seed is wrong because he did
not fulﬁll his obligation to his sister-in-law/wife in
levirate marriage (which is designed to raise up a
family heir for the land [a quality of life concern]);
it is not a judgment on birth control (Genesis 38:
8–10; Deuteronomy 25:5–10). This is corroborated by
Coitus interuptus being permitted by second Temple
rabbi Eliezer (b. Yebam. 34b; t. Nid. 2.6; Feldman,
1968, p. 187). However, as a blessing, fertility can not
be insisted upon as a right. Unfortunately, some will
be infertile, and there is no sin in this, even if it is
repeatedly a condition of pain throughout the Bible
and life. Likewise, there is no sin in attempting to
comply with God’s broad blessing to become fertile,
provided it is through ethical means. Fertility can
be accomplished by a range of enablement’s of each
spouse (medication, surgery, AID, invitro-fertilization,
egg donation, cloning) and by adoption from another,
as well. Additionally, surrogacy is theoretically moral,
but may be practically difﬁcult to facilitate but it might
be possible to ﬁnd a person so generous and giving of
themselves as to carry a baby to term for the purpose
of the intended couple to adopt and raise him as their
own, but it has been done in this generous manner.
Of course, in a polygamous situation fertility through
one wife can diminish some felt need of infertility of
the other, but it rarely meets the psychological need of
the infertile wife and will likely raise other problems
since monogamy is God’s design and humans are
sinful, and of course in many nations polygamy is
illegal (for example, Genesis 2:24; 16:1–16; 21:8–21;
29:15–30:24; 1 Samuel 1:2–28). Sometimes God
will even please the infertile couple with fertility in
spite of their fertility treatment (for example, Genesis
30). On this issue, like other inﬁrmed conditions,
God promises to heal the infertile condition in the
everlasting Kingdom (Isaiah 54:1–3).
On the other side of the fertility issue, it would
be permitted for a society commitment to limit
population, as in China, because they corporately
consider that they have “ﬁlled” that region of the
globe. That is, then fruitfulness enables multiplying
to a full condition through which subduing and ruling
can be accomplished. Such control that an image
of God can bring subdues the creation to comply
with the blessings of God. However, if procreative
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activity hinders human attempts to rule the creation,
procreation as a blessing can be limited to facilitate
the greater purpose and blessing designed for the
image of God, that of ruling the creation (Genesis 1:26
purpose over blessing in 1:28 to facilitate purpose).
Conclusion
Image of God means “a representation of God”
showing that God rules here and as a term “image
of God” identiﬁes that we humans should rule in the
creation. God sets the purpose of His image to ﬁnitely
rule under God’s sovereignty. As images of God we
humans are to play god in bio-ethics, doing miniature
acts of sovereignty under the Sovereign God (Genesis
1:26–28; 5:1, 3; 9:6; James 3:9).
Soul
While “image of God” wonderfully elevates
humanity above the rest of creation, soul connects
a human with the rest of the creation. That is, the
language of the Genesis account identiﬁes that
animals and humans are living souls (Botterweck, &
Ringgren, 1974–2006, 9:510–516; Genesis 1:20, 24,
30; 2:7; 9:4–5, 10; Harris, Archer, & Waltke, 1980,
2:589–591; Kittle & Friedrich, 1974, 9:620,
639–640, 648–649, 653; VanGemeren, 1997, 3:133).
The animals pre-modernly described as souls are
non-microbial animals (ﬁsh, foul, insect, reptile,
amphibian, and mammal). No biblical text discusses
the microbial. Soul has a holistic connotation in
that it signiﬁes a complete living being (Botterweck
& Ringgren; Brown, Murphy, & Malony, 1998,
pp. 22, 178, 186; Dunn, 1998, pp. 76–78; Harris,
Archer & Waltke, 1980; Kittle & Friedrich, 1974;
McKenzie, 1965, p. 839; Rahner & Vorgrimler, 1965,
pp. 442–443; VanGemeren, 1997; Wolff, 1974, pp. 24–
25; 11QTemple 51.19; 54.20; 61.12; 1QS 11.13; CD
12.11-12; 1QH 2.2, 24; 3.6; 5.17–18; 9.18; 15.16). The
words for soul, nephesh (npš/
  ) in the Hebrew and
psyche (ψυχήν) in the Greek, have developed from
the idea of breath to mean the whole person who both
breathes and desires, lives and moves (Exodus 23:12;
Deuteronomy 12:12; Brown, 1974, vol. 3, pp. 676, 679).
Very few biblical references develop “soul” as a part
of a human (Dunn, 1998; Harris Archer, & Waltke,
1980; Kittle & Friedrich, 1974; Pannenberg, 1985,
p. 523; VanGemeren, 1997; Wolff, 1974), and in those
cases it refers to the throat or neck, the organ of
breathing (Isaiah 51:23; Jeremiah 15:9; Luke 2:35;
Kittle & Friedrich, 1974, 9:609, 618). In other places,
soul stands in the place of a pronoun, indicating
living persons (Psalms 54:4; Acts 2:41). At times soul
is combined in a list with other descriptors of human
to communicate that all of a person must be involved
in a task such as loving God (Deuteronomy 6:4–5;
Matthew 22:32; Acts 4:32; 1 Thessalonians 5:23).
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Only rarely is there a verse like Hebrews 4:12
which indicates that the Word of God can separate
between soul and spirit, suggesting the two concepts
are not identical.
This biblical concept of soul is very different
from the philosophical and traditional theological
alternatives. For example, Tertullian followed the
Stoics in conceiving of the human soul as corporeal,
generated with the body (Tertullian, 1869–1870,
p. 9). Plato reasons that the soul is an eternal form
for each human which as eternal continues from a
pre-incarnate existence to a post-incarnate afterlife,
while our shadowy bodies are birthed and then decay
(Plato, 1952, pp. 93, 124, 244–246, 763–764). While
Origen followed Plato’s view of soul (Origen, 1976,
2.9.6), Augustine modiﬁed the concept in the direction
of neo-platonism, denying eternal pre-existence and
afﬁrming a created tripartite quality of each human
soul to reﬂect the Trinity (Augustine, 1952, pp. 265,
360–361, 510, 561, 588). In contrast, Aristotle and
Aquinas proposed a hylomorphic view in which the
material human is formed as soul (Aristotle, 1952,
pp. 177, 538, 559, 567, 600, 631, 642–645; Aquinas,
1952, pp. 14–15, 275–276, 365–367, 368–369,
378–379, 515). René Descartes proposed a radical
form of substance dualism in which the soul is akin
to a thinking substance that is the real person within
the extended substance of body (Descartes, 1952,
pp. 20, 135–136, 208–209). Karl Barth identiﬁes that
body and soul are a “concrete monism,” both terms
describing the unique and singular experience of
the person (Barth, 1936–69, 3/2:393). None of these
philosophical or traditional theological views captures
the sense of the biblical text and the biblical theology
movement on the wholistic human concept of soul as
life or person.
A special contemporary challenge excludes the
conceptofsoulfromtheologicaldiscussionbyadvocating
humans as nonreductive physicalism. Murphy, Brown,
and Anderson advocate a nonreductive physicalism
that considers humans as a “whole complex function,
both in society and in relation to God, which gives
rise to ‘higher’ human capacities such as morality and
spirituality” (Brown, Murphy, & Malony, 1998, p. 2,
25, 49–72, 99–148). Their view is better analyzed
as afﬁrming a full concept of body (which I agree
with) because it actually explores the cognitive and
religious capacities rooted in embodiement and genes,
rather than the absence of the presence of soul. Their
case for nonreductive physicalism excluding soul is
merely to join Murphy in assuming that their case for
embodiement excludes soul (perhaps on the basis of
Ockham’s razor, though this is never mentioned), but
they marshal no evidence for that assumption. They
merely assume their conclusion without relevant
evidence. So nonreductive physicalism is no defeater
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of soul, merely an afﬁrmation of body. Such an
assumption that redundant analysis and causalities
exclude each other counters Murphy’s own assumption
and practice of granting “multiple causation” analyses
elsewhere (Murphy, 2002; Murphy & Ellis, 1996,
pp. 195–228). Such a commitment to “multiple
causation” analysis is a commitment that biblical
theology’s multifaceted-unity hypothesis of humanity
here and Murphy elsewhere share in common.
Additionally, for purposes of informing bio-ethics
(which is what this chapter is about), Murphy’s
nonreductive physicalism is a degenerative
hypothesis, because she nowhere develops the
concept when she discusses her broadly Christian
ethic (Murphy & Ellis, 1996; Murphy, Kallenberg,
& Nation, 1997). So if Murphy ignores nonreductive
physicalism for discussions in bio-ethics, I will do
the same. Furthermore, the Bible and the biblical
theology movement develop “soul” as a meaningful
concept, showing Murphy has different allegiances
than inform this paper.
Biblically, soul can be likened to the self or person.
This concept refers to the most basic or elemental
aspect of the person. Thus, soul is the relationship
of the person to himself and others on an ontological
level. We should not deﬁne “person” in a Descartian
or Lockian manner as a self-aware individual or in
an Aristotelian manner as having the capacity of
self-assertion and self-manipulation. This is most
important in discussions of Trinity and Christology
where the concept of person and nature must
be clariﬁed precisely. If nature is deﬁned by the
attributes of a being, cognition would be an attribute
related to nature. With such a deﬁnition of nature,
Lockian, Descartian, or Aristotilian deﬁnitions for
“person” would render the Trinity into a contradictory
concept, afﬁrming three and one mental Beings
simultaneously (Kennard, 2002, pp. 75–78). In the
orthodox Trinitarian model, then person is deﬁned
by the following coherent manner: an instance of a
spiritual being as a moral end in itself, in relation to
others. In Trinity there are three persons ontologically
and one Divine nature. It is the Divine nature that
is omniscient. In Christology there are two natures
(Divinity and humanity) and one person Jesus
Christ. Chalcedon’s decision identiﬁed Christ’s Deity
as omniscient, and humanity as limited and growing
in knowledge. Thus person and nature are not the
same thing, nor should they be confused. The divine
persons are to be worshipped. Whereas, human,
angelic and animal persons are to be respected to the
level of their respective natures. That is, while both
humans and animals are souls, only humans are
images of God, thus humans are of a higher level of
being than animals.
An additional side consequence of deﬁning
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person in a Descartian, Lockian, or Aristotelian
manner is that infantization and euthanization
would be advocated. We should not deﬁne “person”
in a Descartian or Lockian manner as a self-aware
individual because neither a fetus, nor a newly born
infant can be justiﬁed to be self-aware until months
after birth. Likewise, neither should we deﬁne person
in an Aristotelian manner as having the capacity of
self-assertion and self-manipulation because such
capacity does not develop until months after birth.
Likewise in both deﬁnitions a coma victim or a victim
of only brain-stem functioning would cease to be a
person and thus could be disposed of as mere tissue.
The orthodox Trinitarian deﬁnition of person protects
against such infanticide and euthanasia.
On the authority of stipulations and blessings of
the Noahic covenant: (1) no one should murder (or
euthanize) a human person, (2) humans and animals
who do murder (or euthanize) humans should forfeit
their lives by societal fostered capital punishment, (3)
humans can eat animals, but not while they are alive,
and 4) humans should not eat the emblem of soul, the
blood of the animal (Genesis 9:2–6; Acts 15:20, 29;
Romans 13:4, 7). No governmental response should
over-rule the Divinely designated stewardship and
blessings that are set by God in relationship with
humans. Therefore, it would be unethical to argue
that humans have a moral right to die with dignity
in either natural law or from constitutional rights,
such as the right to privacy. Furthermore, there is no
right to limit suffering, but as responsible agents in
our stewardship under God, we can make attempts
to diminish pain within suffering, especially when it
is requested by the responsible agent or the sufferer.
Quality of life concerns should not be used to overrule the divinely sourced stewardship pressed upon
the human race in toto requiring the communal
obligation to the right to life.
Likewise, there should be a concern for animal
privilege in a biblical view of soul. Animals are
responsible agents and should be rewarded or punished
appropriately to their level of personhood (Genesis
3:1, 13–15; 9:5–6; Exodus 21:28–29; Deuteronomy
25:4; Matthew 12:11–12; Luke 14:5; CD 10:15–11:18
and especially 11:13–14; 4Q 265; Miscellaneous Roles
fragment 7, 1.6–9; m. Besa 3.4). However, animals
are to be subdued and ruled by humans, and even
eaten (Genesis 1:26–28; 9:2–4). Speciﬁcally, animals
are available for bio-ethical experimentation and
attempts to improve human conditions. Furthermore,
it is ethical to use eggs to cultivate human vaccines.
Drug, cloning and surgery experiments on animals
are appropriate to develop treatments for humans.
The bio-ethical concerns would urge against frivolous
or needlessly painful or wasteful use of these
animals, because they are souls, and thus persons.

Bio-Ethics from Image of God and Soul

To concretize this and to guarantee humans will not
be accidentally injured, one is justiﬁed in spraying
perfume in the eyes of bunnies.
Furthermore, in bio-ethics the origin of life is
the origin of the soul and person. David considers
that his inward parts (klyty/    meaning “kidneys”
or the cognitive center of his being; Wolff, 1974,
pp. 63–66) and bones were made by God in the womb
of his mother (Psalms 139:13–15). The continuity
before birth to growing up to adulthood is considered
by David to continue to be himself. David considers
that God has completely planned out his life before
he had experienced any days of it. Eve recognizes
that procreation includes the human intimate sexual
activity and the divine aid to produce a human life
(Genesis 4:1, 25). So no procreation is without divine
and human effort to bring it about. David actually
considers that he began in the heat of intimate sexual
passion and knowledge (’d‘/  , tmyd/  and thus
views himself as in the condition of sin from his
parent’s sexual deed on into his adulthood (Psalms
51:5; Campbell, 2003, pp. 122–124, 175–177). David
as fetal soul is already immersed in the depravity
of sin in the wake of the Fall. Thus, the biblical text
describes the fetal condition in a pre-modern event
oriented description as from the sex of conception
through birth as a continuity of the person after birth,
and attribute to the unborn personal characteristics
(such as a sin condition) from the parental sexual
intercourse on. Likewise, the unborn are even
called by God before birth (Genesis 25:22–23;
Judges 13:2–7; Isaiah 49:1, 5; Galatians 1:15).
Thus abortion is wrong either intentionally or
unintentionally. Exodus 21:22–24 discusses a relevant
legal case concerning the unintended consequences of
striking a pregnant lady. In the striking, “her child”
(yldyh/    ) is made to “come out” (ys’w/   ) in
a live birth. That is, ys’w/   always refers to a live
birth (Genesis 25:25–26; 38:28–30; Jeremiah 1:5;
26:18), unless it is accompanied by the word “death”
(mt/
  , Numbers 12:12; Job 3:11). So, in this instance

yld/  refers to a live child, not a miscarriage. There
is another word for “still birth” in the context but it
is not used in this instance (škl/, Exodus 23:26;
Hosea 9:14). Therefore, the baby is born in Exodus
21:22 prematurely risking her life, so the judges need
to decide on a ﬁne for the striker, since he put the
baby at risk in her pre-maturity. That is, if there is
no further injury to baby or mother then the assessed
ﬁne is the extent of the punishment. However, if
the mother or the baby have further injuries, then
whatever that injury is will be legally meted out
against the striker. If either the baby or the mother
dies the abuser forfeits his life (Campbell, 2003,
pp. 226–227; Exodus 21:23; Middle Assyrian Laws A
51–53 and Laws Lipit-Ishtar, Laws d–f in Roth, 1995,
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pp. 26–27). Both mother and fetus are treated in this
passage as persons with legal rights. Therefore, it is
bio-ethically wrong to abort a fetus for quality of life
concerns and to intentionally use means that prevent
fertilized eggs from being implanted (for example, use
of intra-uterine device or RU486) and birthed. Which
would mean that in vitro-fertilization would best be
done without producing any more fertilized eggs than
used to implant and extra fertilized eggs should be
utilized with parental consent to help others attempt
procreation. The fertilized eggs are not property, but
persons and should not be treated as property. If
the biological parents consider that they do not wish
to make further attempts of implantation of eggs
then these fertilized eggs should not be discarded,
nor available for stem cell research in a manner
that destroys them or treatment, but could be made
available for infertile couples who could beneﬁt by
such adoptive egg donation. Furthermore, the fact
that half of the normally fertilized eggs in the normal
biological process do not implant, neither legitimizes
abortion, nor frees humans from the responsibility
to do what is reasonable to facilitate fertilized eggs
from developing into fully functioning humans to the
extent that we can. A simpler ethical strategy for in
vitro-fertilization would be to only fertilize one egg
per attempt at implantation, because it can side step
this problem of actual human lives cut short by the
choice of not trying for implantation.
Furthermore, a person as soul (npš/) wills, and
feels hate, love, grief, joy, patience, fear, despair,
bitterness and sympathy (Isaiah 1:14; Jeremiah 12:7;
13:17; Job 6:4; 30:25; Psalms 6:3; 35:9; 42:5; Proverbs
31:6). The continuing legacy of the living self is the soul.
A person’s emotions and cognitive ability may change
as she digresses through illnesses like Alzheimer’s or
dementia or stroke or MS, or brain injury, however
there is continuity of soul/person there. Finally,
Revelation 6:9 identiﬁes that the person as soul
retains life beyond death. Further, in this afterlife,
such debilitating illnesses are remedied, so that the
after-life gets beyond these diminishments.
In an attempt to be bilingual and communicate
philosophically to other worldviews, human personal
life may be noticed biologically, to evidence this biblical
model. (1) Humanness is noticed by the range of human
DNA in an after conceived and before death condition
(while normally 46 chromosomes, this permits the
45 chromosome condition of Turner’s syndrome and
the 47 chromosome condition of Down’s syndrome
to also be human). (2) Personal and (3) life can be
noticed by the fusion of soul/life that biblically begins
at conception. This personal life may be evidenced by
noticing the congruence of the properties of growth
(proceeding through a life cycle including effecting the
change permitting only one sperm to penetrate the
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fertilized egg, fusion of DNA with 46 chromosomes,
and at least in some fertilized eggs the addition of a
Y chromosome where it had not been there in the egg
before fertilization), and perhaps self-replication on a
cellular level. The condition of identical twins would
also argue for life beginning at conception, when
the twins are fertilized and the ovum split in two
(without a sharing of common soul). Of course with
implantation, there are further changes (stopping the
woman’s period), and metabolism (cellular and fetal)
through the mother’s blood stream. In this condition
the fetus is not like an organ, because bodily organs
do not eventually have a somewhat independent life
like children can have. As the fetus goes through the
life cycle it adds additional qualities which continue
to increase until puberty (when the person can
reproduce themself as a full person). So there is more
evidence biologically for the ontological condition of
life, as the fetus develops, is birthed and becomes fully
functioning. Eventually, through menopause (selfreplication) and dementia (irritability and dynamic
equilibrium) qualities that indicate life may be lost,
but the ontological person/soul remains. However, this
biological argument is only an empirical way of noticing
the deeper biblical ontological reality of the continuing
soul/life. That is, the observable congruence samples
some evidence of the deeper issue of the consiliance of
human personal life.
Within a person there is the cultivation of his
awareness of himself as the agent of his own thought
and behavior (Kierkegaard, 1941). In other words,
the self relates to the person’s experience of himself,
without the trappings of social facade or presentation,
the individual as he stands before himself, as it
were, psychologically naked. Thus, self as context or
perspective is the primary personal experience.
The blessing of language acquisition is that humans
develop a more sophisticated way of conceptualizing
and having their experience (Wittgenstein, 1953),
and within validating environments, a sense-of-self
becomes increasingly under private control. Language
allows for a temporal perspective on experience and for
the ability to transcend immediacy-the remembered
present (Nagel, 1986). Thus ethically, we should
make our decisions reﬂect a gradation which prefers
fostering meaningful personhood, especially in the
case of conﬂicting ethical options (Geisler, 1971,
pp. 114–138, 1989, pp. 113–133; Kierkegaard, 1967).
That is, in conﬂicting absolutes (which are rare)
maximizing personhood (spirituality, relationship,
and respect) could provide a guide for identifying
higher norms from lower norms. Namely, Love
and afﬁrm God (the greatest person) as primary.
Love and afﬁrm those with whom you have a more
intimate relationship, for it reﬂects the degree of trust
in the covenant (as in marriage) or relationship that
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you have with them. Prefer the household of faith
and those who foster respect. This sort of orientation
could even drive a utilitarianism which prefers
more persons and complete persons over potential
persons (sperm and non-fertilized egg are potential
persons and not mere possessions). However, rarely
do we have to choose one to the exclusion of the other,
because often ethical absolutes do not in fact conﬂict
and with some creativity and faithfulness a way of
resolution through apparent conﬂicts can often be
found. Of course, such gradation does not censure
self-sacriﬁcing choices, for the others beneﬁt.
However, humans also have the unique ability
to over identify with the categories of language
(for example, husband, lawyer, father) and become
trapped in contrived experiences that occur only in
their “mind.” When the contrived experiences are
associated with dreaded pasts that will not change or
futures that have not happened, the individual is the
author of their own distress.
The self or soul, in the context of living, is an
individual capable of considering his own private and
public behaviors before, during and after an event. He
is capable of being mindful of the moment in which he
is living-his environment, his thoughts and emotions,
and his potential responses to them. This self-reﬂective
being develops public and private behaviors both in
response to the content of mindfulness and toward
mindfulness itself. He can train himself to be either
mindful or mindless in the moment with predictable
outcomes. Mindlessness or the lack of self-reﬂective
behavior leads to impulsive, habitual behaviors on the
one hand and on the other, via the function of verbal
behavior, be obsessively “stuck” in catastrophic pasts
and futures that do not exist at the moment, either of
which can result in ineffective living. Such mindless
behavior diminishes consistent ethical thought and
praxis.
Implicit in the biblical discussion of the soul or
self is the suggestion that the person can only have a
self-reﬂective relationship to himself in context. For
example, when attempting to empathize with another
person, an individual will experience increasing
levels of understanding as he gains more information
about the context in which the other lives. Thus, the
self is understood in relationship to one’s awareness of
one’s thoughts, feelings and behaviors in response to
one’s environment, both physical and spiritual. This
has signiﬁcant implications for the person in terms of
purpose, meaning and deﬁnition.
Conclusion
The biblical concept of soul entails a wholistic
meaning of “complete living and willing being” in
a non-microbial pre-modern manner (for example,
Genesis 1:20, 24, 30; 2:7; 9:4–5, 10). Biblically bio-
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ethically humans have a right to life. Those who kill
a fetus are then culpable of murder and were to be
killed by capital punishment (Genesis 4:1, 25; Exodus
21:22–24; Psalm 51:5; 139:13–15; Revelation 6:9).
Additionally, soul means that animals have certain
privileges against extremes of bio-ethical abuse.
Overall Conclusions
Faced with the near unanimity of biblical
anthropology among biblical theology (Botterweck
& Ringgren, 1974–2006; Brown, 1975; Harris.
Archer, & Waltke, 1980; Kittle & Friedrich,
1964–76; VanGemeren, 1997) I propose an analysis
of the biblical words and concepts, focusing on: (1)
“image of God” and (2) “soul.” This approach results
in a functionalism, which I call a multi-faceted unity.
I propose to extend these biblical theology categories
into the ﬁeld of bio-ethics for implications. This
approach is in contrast to christian bio-ethicists who
start from the ﬁeld of philosophy or biology and tack
some devotional elements of the Bible on the rafters
of their view.
(1) Image of God means “a representation of
God” showing that God rules here (Wolff, 1974,
pp. 160–161; Tell Fekheriye inscription 1, 12, 15–16 in
Millard & Bordreuil, 1982, p. 137); 4Q504 fragment
8, lines 4–6 in Wise , Abegg, & Cook,). God sets the
purpose of His image to ﬁnitely rule under God’s
sovereignty. As images of God we humans are to play
god in bio-ethics, doing miniature acts of sovereignty
under the Sovereign God (Genesis 1:26–28; 5:1, 3;
9:6; James 3:9).
This legitimates humans attempting prevention
and recovery means like: ways of controlling pests
(for example, serpents), aids to diminish pain in
child birth, pesticides and herbicides, fertilization of
crops, genetically modiﬁed food, inoculations, drug
and surgery treatment, AID, in vitro-fertilization,
stem cell treatment, gene therapy, and cloning. Such
an image of God concept identiﬁes the theoretically
permissible even though I recognize methodologically
ethical principles raised elsewhere in the paper bring
certain restrictions.
In ruling the creation, anything is permitted
provided it is: (a) Not excluded by God’s command; that
is, don’t disobey God or He could judge you (Genesis
3:17–19; Romans 14:10–12). (b) Anything is permitted
provided it ﬁts within God’s design parameters and is
(c) actively engaged in for the Lord’s glory (Romans
14:6–12). (d) Anything wise is permitted, in that it
helps and does not hinder (Romans 14:13–15:6). (e)
Anything is permitted that ﬁts within an afﬁrming
conscience, rather than violating one’s conscience (a
New Covenant thing; Romans 14:5, 22–23).
(2) The biblical concept of soul entails a wholistic
meaning of “complete living and willing being” in

a non-microbial pre-modern manner (for example,
Genesis 1:20, 24, 30; 2:7; 9:4–5, 10). Thus, soul
means that animals have certain privileges against
extremes of bio-ethical abuse.
Biblically bio-ethically humans have a right to life.
Those who kill a fetus are then culpable of murder
and were to be killed by capital punishment (Genesis
4:1, 25; Exodus 21:22–24; Psalm 51:5; 139:13–15;
Revelation 6:9).
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